The following is a reference document for the blog I posted immediately above. From the link immediately below, I quote here certain very revealing elements of Obama’s plan entitled, “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army.”
For those of you interested in the devious ways an imperial power works its mischief in apparently innocent ways, I consider the following to be required reading.
Barack Obama’s Strategic [African] Plan:
A Collection of Pertinent Quotes
QUOTE: [The entirety of the cover letter dated November 24, 2010]:
I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, consistent with section 4 of the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-172), the enclosed strategic plan entitled, “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army.”
The strategy guides U.S. support across the region to mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). It has four objectives that support regional and multilateral efforts: (a) increase protection of civilians; (b) apprehend or remove from the battlefield Joseph Kony and senior commanders; (c) promote the defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters; and (d) increase humanitarian access and provide continued relief to affected communities.
The strategy identifies priority actions related to protecting civilians and eliminating the threat posed by the LRA. It also provides a framework for the coordination of U.S. efforts and a description of broader efforts in the region. Given the necessity of bringing political, economic, military, and intelligence support to bear in addressing the threat posed by the LRA, the development of the strategy relied on the significant involvement of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Intelligence Community. All will remain engaged throughout implementation.
My Administration looks forward to working closely with the Congress on this important issue.
Sincerely,
Barack Obama
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE:
[All in caps]: Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army
[Not all in caps]:
A strategy to guide United States support across the region for viable multilateral efforts to mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army.
:UNQUOTE: [The entirety of the cover page, which immediately follows the cover letter quoted above.]
QUOTE [pg 1]:
The LRA is one of the most brutal armed groups in Africa. Led by Joseph Kony since the late 1980s, the LRA survives by massacring civilians, looting their villages, and abducting boys and girls as well as men and women, to serve as fighters, porters, and sex slaves. Since the Ugandan army launched Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT) in December 2008, groups of LRA fighters have scattered across central Africa. While Ugandan operations against the LRA have reduced the ranks of fighters and removed from the battlefield several senior commanders, smaller groups of fighters have retained their motivation and capacity to inflict great harm on civilian populations, as demonstrated by several reported atrocities. Joseph Kony and the top leadership of the LRA leadership have been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity. They remain at large.
On May 24, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-172). Public Law 111-172 calls on the United States to develop a strategy to “mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability” posed by the LRA, and reiterated U.S. policy to provide “political, economic, military, and intelligence support” for viable multilateral efforts to apprehend the group’s leaders or remove them from the battlefield, to provide humanitarian assistance, and to promote justice and reconciliation in LRA-affected areas.
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE:(page2):
The policy of the United States is to work with national governments in the region and regional organizations toward a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the conflict that has affected northern Uganda, as well as southern Sudan, and more recently areas of the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In support of this policy, the implementation of the strategy will focus on (a) identifying the resources devoted to this effort; (b) increasing engagement with regional and multilateral partners to respond to the LRA; (c) providing clear links to broader regional strategies and priorities; and (d) achieving greater effectiveness and cross-cutting efforts at multiple levels. The extent to which the United States is able to engage in the full range of objectives described in the strategy is dependent on the availability of resources. The United States will also work with the international community to expand and synchronize available resources. Uganda has been the mainstay of efforts to counter the LRA and there is no guarantee the UPDF operations will continue indefinitely, given competing security priorities and the great distances from Uganda of LRA combatants. A key part of this strategy is to work with all regional and international partners to develop broad support and capacity for counter LRA actions.
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE [pg. 2]:
…The multi-year strategy provides an overarching plan for consistent action along these lines of effort. Recognizing that the LRA presents a unique and changing threat, the specific actions implemented under the strategy may need to respond flexibly. Though the challenge is complex, the vision remains simple: people in central Africa are free from the threat of LRA violence and have the freedom to pursue their livelihoods.
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE (p. 3):
The LRA has plagued central Africa, particularly northern Uganda, for more than 2 decades. Although the LRA is now comprised of only several hundred militia members using small arms, its tactics ensure that it remains a dangerous force in the region…
When attacking civilians, the LRA instills fear by conducting brutal executions. Civilians, including women and children, are abducted to serve as porters, sex slaves, and fighters. Abductees often remain with the LRA due to psychological manipulation. Those caught trying to escape from the LRA are frequently summarily executed. In contrast to many other armed groups which occasionally adopt such brutal tactics, the LRA has conducted such atrocities on a systematic and prolonged basis.
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE (p.3):
The region in which the LRA operates is roughly equivalent in size to the state of California.
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE (p3):
As a result of OLT, the LRA has fractured and dispersed, and several LRA commanders have been killed or have defected. At present, numerous unofficial reports estimate that the overall strength of the LRA is only 200-300 combatants in addition to a number of associated persons, including family members, non-combatants, and abductees. Most of those in the lower ranks of the LRA are believed to be abductees.
Although the LRA’s ranks and organization have been diminished under the military pressure that kept it on the run, the group remains capable of inflicting human suffering and a sense of fear among vulnerable populations. Furthermore, as it has in the past, the LRA could regroup and increase its capacity, especially if it receives any significant outside support. Although the LRA has come under sustained military pressure, its leaders have reportedly been able to maintain some strategic planning capability as demonstrated by the survival of Joseph Kony and several other senior commanders. However, since the LRA has dispersed and has no single base of operations, communications between LRA leaders are considered to be limited…
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE (p4):
The UPDF has been the primary national force actively pursuing the LRA…There are also scattered self-defense groups in the region as well as a variety of other armed actors.
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE (p6):
…As of November 2010, the United States has provided more than $23 million to the UPDF for OLT, largely in the form of logistical (airlift, fuel, and trucks) and intelligence support, since December 2008…
…In FY 2010, the United States Government provided more than $34 million in humanitarian assistance to LRA-affected populations…
In northern Uganda, the United States Government provided a total of $168 million in assistance in FY 2010, focusing primarily on transitional and longer-term development programs…In FY 2009, the United States Government provided $165 million.
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE(P7 - 8):
…As demonstration of the extraordinary bipartisan cooperation on this issue, at the time of signing, the legislation had 64 total Senate co-sponsors and 201 total House co-sponsors, which made it the most widely cosponsored bill on sub-Saharan Africa in recent U.S. history….
…Uganda has been the mainstay of efforts to counter the LRA and there is no guarantee that UPDF operations will continue indefinitely, given competing security priorities and the great distances from Uganda of LRA combatants. A key part of this strategy is to work with all regional and international partners to develop broad support and capacity for counter LRA action. Should the UPDF withdraw its support from this operation, this would be a major setback and would require a significant build-up in other regional forces which might take several years.
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE: (P8): [The following is the entire paragraph following the heading of “Statement of Policy.”]:
Statement of Policy
The policy of the United States is to work with national governments and regional organizations in the area toward a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the LRA conflict by: (a) providing political, economic, military, and intelligence support for viable multilateral efforts to protect civilians from the LRA, to apprehend or remove from the battlefield Joseph Kony and other top leaders, and to disarm and demobilize the remaining LRA fighters; (b) targeting assistance to respond to the humanitarian needs of populations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan currently affected by the activity of the LRA; and (c) further supporting efforts of the Government of Uganda and civil society to promote comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda.
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE: (page 9):
[One of the strategic outcomes listed is that]…former LRA combatants…are reintegrated in their home areas…
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE: (Page 9):
It is important to note that any U.S. strategy to mitigate and eliminate the LRA threat in central Africa presupposes several important assumptions.
· Any reduction in military or diplomatic pressure, or the provision of safe haven by any state or non-state actor, could enable the LRA to regroup and rebuild its forces.
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE: Page 13
…The LRA is broken up into small groups and spread across an enormous area in the northern DRC, the CAR, and Sudan. Much of the terrain is sparsely populated and covered in thick vegetation with few roads or means of communication, thereby enabling the LRA to evade capture.
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE: (Page 13):
…the splintering of the LRA has meant that smaller, highly mobile LRA units menace civilians across a wider territory.
QUOTE: (Page 14):
The following objectives describe U.S. efforts in support of regional and multilateral partners to maintain military and diplomatic pressure on the LRA. An important component is the integrated logistical, operational, and intelligence assistance at multiple levels in order to increase the likelihood of success in apprehending or removing Joseph Kony and his key commanders. United States Government assistance will be provided in a manner that is consistent with U.S. and international law and with other U.S. efforts to support the further professionalization of the UPDF.
Objective 2.1: Provide enhanced integrated logistical, operational, and intelligence assistance in support of regional and multilateral partners.
The United States will seek to build the capacity of partners to effectively integrate and coordinate such support at multiple levels…
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE: Page 15:
…the majority of LRA fighters…were abducted and forced to fight for the LRA in order to survive…
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE: (Page 16):
The Government of Uganda has significant architecture in place to support defectors [from the LRA]. Under this objective, the United States Government will work to spread lessons learned from Uganda to other affected countries in the region and support their implementation. This will help ensure a safe defection process, regardless of the defector’s country of origin….
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE: (page 21):
The United States has worked with its U.N. Security Council partners to ensure U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region increase their cooperation, coordination, and information sharing, so to more effectively address the LRA threat.
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE: (Page 21):
In addition, nongovernmental organizations, advocacy groups, think tanks, and other institutions have played a critical role in framing the problem and raising international attention (including popular U.S. support for congressional action).
:UNQUOTE.
QUOTE: (Page 22):
This strategy is consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States (2010). … the National Security Strategy recognizes that “those who intentionally target innocent civilians must be held accountable.”
…
Along with health, education, and development assistance, the United States also funds and conducts a number of programs in Uganda designed to train and professionalize the Ugandan military and police, with a strong emphasis on human rights.
:UNQUOTE.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Steven Searle for US President in 2012
Founder of the Independent Contractors’ Party
“I consider Obama’s Plan (above) to be on a par with the Protocol of the Elders of Zion, in terms of implied threat-level. However, Obama’s Plan is even deadlier because, unlike the Protocols, it’s not a fabrication.”
Contact me at bpa_cinc@yahoo.com
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